How to measure competition in an economy in transition

This paper attempts to find a robust method of measuring competition when firms' operational activities are subject to frictions. The first part theoretically tests the indicative quality of two competition measures, the price‐cost margin (PCM) and the profit elasticity, in a model of monopolistic competition. The second part studies the empirical performance of the indices for a panel of Ukrainian manufacturing firms. This study offers a new approach to measuring profit elasticity that relies on structural estimation of a production function. The estimation methodology retrieves a productivity index that is adjusted to imperfect competition. The proposed method of measuring profit elasticity is found to be robust to frictions, but the PCM and traditional profit elasticity are biased, especially when the intensity of competition is low. Empirical findings show that competition exhibits a significantly positive correlation with aggregate productivity performance, while its impact on firm productivity is nonlinear.     

An economic–geographic assessment of the potential for a new air transport hub in post-Gaddafi Libya

Post-war Libya is faced with the challenge of adopting an air transport strategy for the future. One issue is how to address projects inaugurated under the Gaddafi government, such as the terminal extension at Tripoli International Airport. Additionally, the state-owned Afriqiyah Airlines had been establishing a niche hub in Tripoli before the 2011 war, but this development has subsequently been stalled.Against this background, we analyse the prospects of an air transport hub operation in Libya, focusing on traffic between Africa and Europe, from a bird’s-eye economic–geographic view. First, a literature review is undertaken to identify general success factors for air transport hubs. Second, a weighted average distance penalty (WADP) indicator is developed and applied to Tripoli as a potential hub location. This indicator considers all 4755 O&Ds between Europe and Africa with more than 100 passengers in 2012. For sensitivity reasons, alternative WADPs are estimated for the 3209 traffic flows not including North Africa and for (forecasted) future air traffic demand in 2020. The results for Tripoli International Airport are benchmarked against competing hub locations, such as Algiers, Cairo, and the major European airports. We conclude by discussing the implications of the current and anticipated future security and economic situation in the country.     

Firm entry deregulation,competition and returns to education and skill

This paper studies the effect of firm entry deregulation on the returns to skill and education. We exploit a comprehensive episode of entry deregulation, unique in the industrialized world, as a quasi-natural experiment. Using matched employer–employee data for the universe of workers and firms in Portugal, we show that increased product market competition, which resulted from deregulation, increased the returns to a university degree and the returns to skill. We verify that our results are not driven by changes in employment composition, and are unlikely to be driven by skill-biased technical change, or by workers who change skill levels after the deregulation.     

DEFINING RELEVANT MARKETS FOR PHARMACEUTICALS

To identify the relevant product markets for Swedish pharmaceuticals, a spatial econometrics approach is employed. First, we calculate Moran's Is for different market definitions and then we use a spatial Durbin model to determine the effect of price changes on quantity sold of own and competing products. As expected, the results show that competition is strongest between close substitutes; however, the relevant product markets for Swedish pharmaceuticals extend beyond close substitutes down to products included in the same class on the four‐digit level of the Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical system as defined by the World Health Organization. The spatial regression model further indicates that increases in the price of a product significantly lower quantity sold of that product and in the same time increase the quantity sold of competing products. For close substitutes (products belonging to the same class on the seven‐digit level of the Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical system), as well as for products that, without being close substitutes, belong to the same therapeutic/pharmacological/chemical subgroup (the same class on the five‐digit level of the Anatomic Therapeutic Chemical system), increased competition is also visible after 1 July 2009 when the latest policy changes with regards to pharmaceuticals have been implemented in Sweden.     

Bank competition,concentration and financial stability in the Turkish banking industry

This paper analyzes the impact of competition and concentration on bank stability in the Turkish banking industry over the period 2002–2012. The Boone indicator and the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index are used as proxies for competition, while the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio and Z-scores are used as proxies for bank stability. The main results indicate that competition is negatively related to the NPL ratio but positively related to the Z-score. The results further indicate that greater concentration has a positive impact on the NPL and a negative impact on the Z-score. We also use a quadratic term of the competition measures to capture a possible non-linear relationship between competition and stability. The results show that the coefficient of the quadratic term is negative for the NPL model and positive for the Z-score model. Overall, our findings provide support for the competition-fragility view.     

Competition,firm size and returns to skills: Evidence from currency shocks and market liberalisations

We investigate the impact of product market competition on returns to skills in Italy using a longitudinal dataset on individual working histories. This impact is identified using three exogenous shocks affecting competition: the unforeseen devaluation of the Lira in 1992, its return to a fixed exchange regime in 1996 and the market liberalisation in the utility and transport sectors in the late 1990s–early 2000s. We analyse how firm heterogeneity and shocks of different types and signs affect the impact of competition on skill premia. We find that opposite shocks have opposite effects: an increase (resp. decrease) in international competition increases (resp. decreases) skill premia. Moreover, international shocks have greater effects on medium sized firms, while domestic liberalisation shocks have greater effects on large incumbents.     

Risk pricing of wholesale funds and the behavior of retail deposit rates

We explore the relationship between bank risk and retail deposits. Predicted risk premiums on wholesale funds explain retail rate heterogeneity through two channels. First, increased bank risk premiums encourage the bank to substitute from wholesale funds to small certificates of deposits (CD) by increasing small CD rates. Second, increased rival risk premiums in a local market require the bank to increase small CD rates even more. Our results are consistent with risk encouraging the use of small CDs as a marginal source of funds and promoting local market competition for small CDs. As risk premiums rise, banks also reduce rates on other retail deposits. Our approach has implications for regulatory and monetary policies and financial stability.     

REGULATION STRATEGIES FOR THE PROVISION OF PATERNALISTIC GOODS

In this study, we analyze the regulation of markets for the provision of services whose costs are subsidized for paternalistic reasons. We model the choice of a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize consumer welfare in a setting where quality cannot be verified and the good provided is fully subsidized. The choice is thus made between two types of providers (profit maximizers and altruistic providers) and two frameworks (monopoly franchise and quality competition). Our analysis shows that in this environment the performance of mixed markets is always dominated by pure forms. Moreover, although making efficient providers compete for the market minimizes cost, the choice of quality competition with altruistic providers may be preferable from a welfare point of view whenever service quality is relevant and the productivity differential is not substantial.     

Optimal order display in limit order markets with liquidity competition

Order display is associated with benefits and costs. Benefits arise from increased execution-priority, while costs are due to adverse market impact. We analyze a structural model of optimal order placement that captures trade-off between the costs and benefits of order display. For a benchmark model of pure liquidity competition, we give a closed-form solution for optimal display sizes. We show that competition in liquidity supply incentivizes the use of hidden orders to prevent losses due to over-bidding. Thus, because aggressive liquidity competition is more prevalent in liquid stocks, our model predicts that the proportion of hidden liquidity is higher in liquid markets. Our theoretical considerations ares supported by an empirical analysis using high-frequency order-message data from NASDAQ. We find that there are no benefits in hiding orders in il-liquid stocks, whereas the performance gains can be significant in liquid stocks.     

Robustness to strategic uncertainty

We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.